China in the post-Mao era was transformed by a veritable economic miracle and simultaneously underwent a series of radical époque-making changes in the Chinese ruling classes' political and ideological approach to government. The continued rapid growth and the expansion of a consumer society have also contributed to the discrediting of those traditional values which for many years underpinned and fortified the force of communism. In addition to the demise of traditional values, the waning belief in Maoist ideology and the rise of consumerism as the new ideological credo, there have also been transformations in some of the main pillars of Chinese society, in particular the family, as a result of a resurgence of social practices that were thought to belong to the past. The most widespread in contemporary China is the "bao ernai" phenomenon, or the taking of a second wife, which involves mainly businessmen and politicians, strictly related to the increase of corruption. The increasingly worrying proportions assumed in recent years by such practice, while risking to compromise the sustenance of the much exalted harmonious society, have favoured the emergence of a heated debate inside the Chinese society.
The Two Faces of the Chinese Miracle
China in the post-Mao era was transformed by a veritable economic miracle and simultaneously underwent a series of radical époque-making changes in the Chinese ruling classes' political and ideological approach to government. This was instigated by the extremely pragmatic policies and an adaptation to the new economic and social reality produced by the reform policies that, in Deng Xiaoping's mind, were the only way for the CCP to maintain its monopoly hold on power (Baum, 1996; Gittings, 2005; Vogel, 2011) . Specifically, the espousal of the concept of a 'socialist market economy' (shehuizhuyi shichang jingji), also known as 'socialism with Chinese characteristics' (Zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi), on the one hand, and the Three Represents Theory (san ge diabiao lilun) on the other, caused some observers to pose the question as to whether or not China should still be considered a socialist country.
In truth, while the institutional system based on the three-tier hierarchy of party-state-army is still in place, together with an ideology that continues to honour and celebrate socialism and the leading role of the Communist Party, the very nature of the CCP has been transformed by profound changes. Today it is no longer the party of the working classes, peasants and soldiers united in a common struggle, but has instead become the party of government, obliged therefore to represent all the forces in society that contribute to the 'economic development' of the nation (i.e. private entrepreneurs, capitalists, managers, technicians and intellectuals who together comprise the more advanced strata in society) (Fewsmith, 2002 (Fewsmith, , 2003 . On closer inspection, however, it does appear evident that such changes have not marked any real turning point in China, which proceeds along a path of reforms orchestrated by a party that professes to be Communist (it is only by name) and whose chief objective is to maintain the high rates of growth registered in the past few decades. The alternative would be the destabilization of Chinese society and an end to the 'Mandate of Heaven' (tianming) for its legitimacy to govern.
At the same time, the continued rapid growth and the expansion of a consumer society have contributed to the discrediting of a whole series of values such as attention to the common good, social justice, honesty and rectitude, which for many years underpinned and fortified the force of communism, governing its capacity to mobilize the Chinese population. The supreme 'good' today has become "money" and business dealing, which seems to have taken over as a guiding force in the party, in the government and in society as a whole. The most often heard new year wish for the Chinese is "gongxi facai" ("May you become rich"). In addition to the demise of traditional values, the waning belief in Maoist ideology and the rise of consumerism as the new ideological credo, there have also been transformations in some of the main pillars of Chinese society, in particular the family (Note 1) as a result of a resurgence of social practices that were thought to belong to the past. The most widespread in contempory China is the "bao ernai" phenomenon, or the taking of a second wife or concubine.
Prostitution in Chinese History
China has a long history of institutionalized prostitution, sustained and upheld by the patriarchal custom of taking concubines together with the ancient practice of priming girls for a life as courtesans, which has served as the subject matter of many classic works of Chinese literature. Society in imperial China was essentially based on a patriarchal social system in which women were subordinated to men. Generally speaking, a woman had five basic roles in life: wife, concubine, servant, nun, and prostitute. A traditional Chinese wife (qizi or da laopo) for a well-being family had to come from a good family, be servile, innocent and fertile, in order to be able to fulfill her main function in life, namely to guarantee the continuation of the family lineage (raising male off-spring in particular). A wife did not necessarily have to be beautiful or educated; on the contrary, ugly, cold and talentless women were often preferred, while beauty and sexual prowess were the required attributes of concubines (qie or xiao laopo), who generally came from poor and uneducated families and were young, capricious and whimsical. Since they were considered as little more than "toys", they could only hope to climb up the social scale when the official wife died (Dougherty, 2006, p.5) .
In more recent times, the causes of Shanghai's moral decadence in the 1930s, when it was known as the "Pearl of Asia" and also as the "brothel of Asia" or the paradise of adventure seekers, were to be found in the proliferation of prostitution, which was the mainstay of the entertainment industry at that time (Onnis, 2005, chap. 3). Immediately after the Communists came to power in 1949, one of the most urgent measures that the new regime wanted to take was to eradicate the phenomenon of prostitution -which in the 'century of shame and humiliation' (bainian chiru) the rich and developed West had been responsible for disseminating -and also to end the practice of taking concubines, since it was the dissolute practice of richer classes (Wu Zhihong, 2001 ). Indeed, the CCP began a concerted and at least apparently successful campaign of repression that aimed at eradicating it within a decade in the 1950s. In doing so, Mao intended to pay homage and offer justice to those whom he referred to as "the other side of the sky", i.e. women, who had until then been forced to succumb to the Confucian dictates of the so-called "three submissions and four virtues" (obedience to the father, the husband, and after the death of the latter, obedience to the eldest son; adherence to the virtues of faith, beauty, and deference in use of language and correctness in behavior, as well as diligence in household tasks). In other words, women would be encouraged to participate where possible, in the political, economic and social life of the country. Right from the beginning, then, Chinese women benefited greatly from these Communist Party's reforms; consider for example the Marriage Law passed in 1950, which put an end to a whole host of practices and principles that were detrimental to the dignity of women, such as arranged marriages and polygamy. Recent studies have shown, however, that prostitution in Maoist China had not been completely repressed and controlled, and that the most powerful government officials continued with their custom of maintaining numerous wives and concubines. Indeed, two leading experts on this subject at the University of Beijing, the director of sociological studies of sexual behaviour, Pan Suimin, and Li Yinhe of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argue that the so-called 'invisible' prostitution, or the practice of providing sexual favours in return for certain privileges, was alive and well in Maoist China, and much practiced by Mao himself (Pan Suimin, 1996, pp.20-21; Li Zhusui, 1994) . Deng Xiaoping's reform and open-door policy (gaige kaifang) signaled the end of rigid Communist morals, the rise of economic prosperity and the espousal of utilitarian principles that place financial gain above all else; it also led to the return of the ancient Confucian tradition of patriarchal polygamy. Meanwhile, the market for prostitution continued to grow and became more widespread, often with local authorities playing an active role in encouraging what would soon become a vast industry involving millions of people and generating a turnover of vast magnitude (Zhong Wei, 2000; Zhang Fan, 2007) . It also came to be associated with a series of problems such as organized crime, government corruption, and more seriously the mushrooming of sexually transmitted diseases. The campaigns against various forms of social deviation including police operations to eliminate pornography (saohuang dafei) and in general "spiritual contamination" (jingshen wuran) launched in the 1980s, seemed to have had little effect; neither did the increased severity of sentences for crimes related to prostitution. In fact, while the Penal Code (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa) of 1979 had relatively moderate punishments for organizing and aiding and abetting prostitution, an amendment passed in 1983 by the National People's Congress (NPC) set the maximum penalty, i.e. the death penalty, for such crimes. Although the new 1999 Penal Code reduced penalties for some offences, the death penalty was maintained (art. 358) for more serious crimes (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xinfa, p.83). Clients and prostitutes themselves are subject to fines, as stated in the Regulation for offenses related to disturbance of public order (Zhonggua renmin gongheguo zhi'an guanli chufa tiaoli).
The New Forms of Prostitution in Contemporary China
Being the revival of prostitution a direct consequence of the reform and open-door policies, it was initially confined to the coastal cities in the eastern and southern parts of the country, but during the 1990s it gradually became a nationwide phenomenon. The main factor that triggered the resurgence of prostitution was the migration of large numbers of people from the countryside to the cities (known as liudong renkou, or "floating population") (Note 2) made possible by the slackening of strict measures of control that obliged people to remain tied to their places of origins (hukou) and workpaces (danwei). However, with the urban employment market still in an embryonic phase, those migrant workers with little or no qualifications found themselves unable to find any form of employment other than as sex workers.
The sector of the population that comprised and helped burgeon the main client base for paid sex were male migrant workers with an average age of 30, working to support families back home that they could only see during periods of national holidays and festivities. The supply side of the market was made up of migrant female workers attracted by the lure of fast and easy earnings, as well as ex-employees of state companies who had lost their jobs following company restructuring or downsizing and were unable to find employment opportunities in an increasingly competitive work market (Franceschini, 2008, p.235) . Although what initially pushed people into the world of prostitution was economic hardship and necessity, during the last years of the 1990s and the start of the new millennium, a number of more educated women, many of them university students, deliberately chose to resort to prostitution as a means to ensure themselves financial security as well as to gain access into higher social circles and more attractive life styles (Miao Cuihuai & Li Longhai, 2008, p.97) . As a result, the new clients also tended to be better educated, more sophisticated and ostentatious.
The sex industry in post-Maoist China found itself having to adapt to the needs of a highly diversified client base, from the migrant worker to the successful business manager or high level government official and due to this diversification grew into an industry of vast proportions. The diverse nature of the phenomenon is clearly indicated in a seven-level ranking order list compiled by the Chinese authorities (Sex Work in China, 1999 -2000 . In descending order, at the top of the hierarchy are the ernai, the "second wives" or simply the lovers of rich and influential men, usually government officials or businessmen, who exchange sexual favours in return for accommodation and a regular income. In a second position on the hierarchy and similar in many ways to the ernai are the baopo, or so-called "girls for rent", who are sought by wealthy clients for short periods during business trips or work appointments, for a pre-arranged recompense. Those in the next category are known as peinü ("escort" girls); they basically accompany men to karaoke clubs, dance halls, restaurants and tea houses where they spend time chatting to their prospective clients before moving on from the meeting place to continue the evening together. The peinü are generally girls of a good social standing and are much in vogue in large cities such as Beijing and Shanghai; they command high prices. Next come the dingdong xiaojie ("dingdong" girls), many of whom are university students marketing themselves on internet sites or by telephoning clients directly in hotel rooms. Fifth place on the descending order list are the falangmei or "sisters of hairdressing salons" who advertise themselves as masseurs or hairdressers but in reality are offering sex in private rooms behind beauty centres, hair salons (basically brothels), saunas and so on. With their trademark red lights outside the shops, the falangmei are the most visible example of the phenomenon of prostitution in contemporary China. They are mainly uneducated migrant workers coming from rural areas, who are closely monitored by their protectors. The lowest two levels on the scale involve more direct forms of an exchange of 'money for sex' between client and prostitute, with no connection to the new forms of entertainment and without the involvement of corrupt government officials or white collar criminality. They are commonly known as jienü ("street girls") and xiagongpeng ("after-work shacks"), i.e. women who sell sex to poor migrant and itinerant workers. The xiagongpeng are generally also poor and not particularly attractive, but they do perform the important function of providing solace in the empty lives of their clients who have left their families at home to come and work in the city.
The Social Consequences of the "Bao Ernai" Phenomenon
It was towards the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium, just at the time when the direct involvement of the political elite in the whole phenomenon was coming to light, that a number of scholars began to warn of the damage and threat to social stability that the practice of ernai was posing; at the same time, the ernai were coming under attack from legitimate wives -ironically promoted to the status of "first wives", in complete contradiction with the idea of marriage as a monogamous, heterosexual institution (yi fu yi qi zhi) -as well as from certain sectors of society in general.
With official divorce statistics showing that the ernai were the leading cause of breakdown in family relations (Zhang Yuanting, 2007, p.20 ) the standing committee of the National People's Congress was prompted into amending (April 2001) the 1980 Law on Marriage, making adultery and concubinage illegal. (Note 3) Regardless of the statistics, if the existence of ernai continues to be tolerated (on some occasions they ensure the continuing of a family lineage) it will mean perpetuating the traditional Chinese patriarchal family and risking the setback of all the modern progress made in Chinese society (in particular as regards women) over the past few decades. The revival of concubinage in its modern version of ernai has also worsened another phenomenon which had emerged at the beginning of the 1980's, i.e. enforced celibacy for life for the poorest and least enterprising men. In fact, one consequence of the 'single child' policy that inevitably meant a preference for male progeny, has been a considerable disparity in the proportion of the two genders. The upshot of this is that a poor boy from a rural area will find it more and more difficult to find a wife, because many of those who would normally be available are ensnared by more wealthy men who 'take' them as second wives. Furthermore, the phenomenon has also brought about the growth of the so-called "hidden population" (yinbi renkou), which are a source of great concern for legitimate wives given that under Chinese law children born outside marriage have the same inheritance rights (Shen Hsiu-hua, 2008, p.12) as those born from the first marriage. Not surprisingly, the first wives from places most affected, in particular Taiwanese women, have turned first to religious organizations for comfort and solidarity and have now begun to form leagues and associations aimed at raising awareness among the public in general and other groups of women in particular, of the threat posed by women they define as mercenaries and dowry hunters, whose only aim is material gain (Ibid., pp. 11-12). In January 2003, in response to pressure from these groups, the Taiwanese government passed an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure brought in so that legitimate wives filing for divorce over an extra-marital relationship can obtain direct access to their share of the husbands assets for which they have a right to claim (Ibid., p. 20) . On the other hand, the wives of Hong Kong men tend to opt for silence due in part to the social stigma attached to the failure of a marriage in a society with a relatively low divorce rate, but also in order not to face maternity on their own (Lang & Smart, 2002, p.555) . Another vital issue is that promiscuity jeopardizes the health of both wives and children, through the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including of course, AIDS. Lastly, but no less importantly, the escalation of such a practice has contributed to fuelling the increase in corruption, in particular among government officials. If recent statistics are to be believed, nine out of ten party officials keep lovers, resulting in exorbitant costs of maintaining an ernai (Watts, 2007) .
The Current Debate on Prostitution in China
The innumerable consequences of a social phenomenon of such breadth and complexity has in recent years come under the scrutiny of the Chinese academic community as well as contemporary authors -just as concubines were a common theme in classical literature; the writings of some young female authors have been labeled under a literary current known as jinü wenxue, or simply "prostitution literature." (Note 4)
The most fervent debate inside the Chinese society has concentrated mainly on the "bao ernai" phenomenon for two main reasons. Firstly, because the growing trend is unquestionably associated with rampant corruption among high ranking party officials, and white collar functionaries in general, but also because of the potentially destabilizing effect it has on the family and on society as a whole (Shi Lihua & Hu Aiguo, 2002) . As mentioned above, in the past few years in China, as a result of the economic boom set in motion by Deng Xiaoping's "new path" policy, the traditional role of the concubine turned rapidly into more of a career and financial advancement option chosen by women throughout the country, although it remained confined largely to urban areas. Yet, whereas the ernai phenomenon initially remained a hidden 'trend' confined to the coastal provinces in the South and to business environments, it grew into a worrying problem once it emerged that several local businessmen (Note 5) and in particular high ranking government officials were involved. It was symptomatic of the ever increasing widespread corruption within China, confirmed by the revelation of a series of scandals implicating party and government officials at the highest levels. (Note 6) Already at the start of the millennium, an internet search using the words "bao ernai" on Sohu.com -one of the most frequently used internet portals -obtained about 3,800 returns, thus indicating how prevalent the fad, or rather serious the social problem actually was (Shi Lihua & Hu Aiguo, 2002, p.62) . Nanren youwei cai bao ernai (a man of promise will contract a second wife) has become a much-heard expression and the "men of promise" are admired and emulated by the less fortunate, albeit with a certain amount of envy. In short, "bao ernai" has become such a consolidated social trend that it is spawning material utilitarian obsessions to the detriment of moral values (Ibid., p. 63).
The increasing spread of "bao ernai," meaning literally "contracting a second wife," though in a wider sense, "keeping a lover," has become not only the subject of much debate in the media and in society, but also a subject of academic enquiry, as evidenced by numerous studies published on the extra-marital relationships between businessmen from Hong Kong and Taiwan with mainland Chinese women (Zhang Xingkui, 2008; Shen Hsiu-hua, 2008) . A number of authors have explained how the rapid industrialization in Southern China in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s attracted in particular Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan (tongbao), thus 'bringing together' two categories of migrants. The first of these were young Chinese women from poor rural areas looking for work and opportunities to climb the social ladder, while the second were business entrepreneurs from Hong Kong who were setting up operations in the coastal provinces of the South. With their being no shortage of occasions for work relations developing into extramarital affairs (hunwailian), there reemerged a sort of peripheral polygyny, whereby Hong Kong businessmen with wives and children on the island, maintain a second family with young migrant women on the mainland. Economic ties between Taiwan and the coastal province of Fujian as well as with Singapore led to analogous relationships emerging between Taiwanese and Singaporean businessmen and young Chinese female emigrants living in Fujian or other coastal provinces (Lang & Smart, 2002, pp.546, 562) . According to the Chinese scholar Zheng Tiantian it was during the transition phase from a planned economy to a market economy that the custom of offering sex as a ritual part of a business deal really took hold, as it was seen to be a means of consolidating local connections and establishing relations of trust with potential partners. In other words, it was an essential ingredient for ensuring business deals went ahead (Zheng Tiantian, 2006) . Various studies carried out on the subject have concluded that the maintaining of a lover in the tradition of "bao ernai" has become a veritable status symbol or a display of cultural kudos in the world of business enterprise. For a man, having a lover is effectively a statement of his economic standing and virility (Shi Lihua & Hu Aiguo, 2002, p.62) ; the lifestyle and material prosperity of an ernai reflects the spending power of her client, while her beauty is indicative of his good taste (Miao Cuihuai & Li Longhai, 2008, p. 97 ).
As has been described above, it is clear that the ernai trend is typically an urban phenomenon which has spread chiefly in the province of Guangdong, but is also common in the vast majority of prosperous areas of the country, such as Shanghai, where they are often referred to as jin si niao ("canaries of golden silk") and in Beijing, where they are known as xiao mi ("little honey"). The most striking visible evidence of the phenomenon in many of the rich industrialized areas of eastern and western China (from Hangzhou to Shenzhen) is the presence of entire luxury neighbourhoods known as ernai cun, or "second wife condominiums," inhabited by young lovers (often with the children born from these relationships) of rich commuter businessmen. They can be seen dressed flamboyantly in their designer clothes and precious jewelry, frequenting fashionable health and beauty centres, driving ostentatiously in BMWs, Audis and Minis or promenading with their small 'designer' dogs sitting inside their original Gucci handbags. Some also work in businesses such as in real estate or as interior designers and decorators (Ibid.). In a few cases, ernai with high level liaisons have been entrusted with top positions, as revealed by the numerous government corruption scandals in which they have been implicated, in particular the laundering of dirty money (La moda delle "seconde mogli ", 2007, pp.61-62) .
The State/Party Reaction
In February 2004 the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party took the unprecedented step of passing a regulation with disciplinary measures regarding the private lives of party members (Zhongguo gongchandang jilu waiwu tiaoli), in an attempt to halt the dissemination of the "fad" among public officials. (Note 7) Specifically, article 150 states as follows: "Those who commit adultery give a negative image, and must receive a plain or severe warning; in quite serious cases, the guilty member shall be temporarily removed from the party, or an internal investigation will be launched; in extreme cases, provisions are made for expulsion from the party. In cases of adultery with spouses of serving military personnel, punishment shall be as indicated in previous clause, or more severe. In proven cases of bigamy or the maintaining of female (male) lovers, culprits shall be expelled from the party." Indeed, the most publicized recent cases of corruption, many of them reported in the Italian press Del Corona, 2007) , have revealed that the practice of "bao ernai" had become a habitual vice among corrupt officials. Official confirmation was given by the Party Officials anti-corruption department (Fanfu bumen) itself; it was openly admitted that of the corrupt officials identified since 2002, the percentage of those harbouring "second wives" had reached 90%. (La moda delle "seconde mogli", 2007, p.63 ). An interesting point that came out in article 150 of the Communist Party's Regulation on intra-party disciplinary measures is the reference to the maintenance of "male" lovers. Indeed, a parallel phenomenon has recently emerged, wherein rich women entrepreneurs or the neglected wives of millionaire husbands 'rent' gigolos at a cost of thousands of euros a day, to accompany them on shopping trips, to dine out, or to go out to clubs or discoteques and on to complete the evening's entertainment; there are also cases of female state officials who take on "second husbands" (Ibid., pp.70-71). However, this is still a minor phenomenon by comparison.
The Academic Community "Recipe"
Having brought the dangers to social stability to public attention, the Chinese academic community is also addressing the question of how best to intervene and control a phenomenon that has now assumed increasingly worrying proportions. According to Shi Lihua and Hu Aiguo (2008, p.64) , the only way to deal with this strictly social phenomenon is to tackle the causes of its dissemination; firstly, by ensuring a more equitable economic growth, reducing the gap between urban and rural areas in order to arrest or curtail the continual movement of "floating population"; helping women to escape from the poverty trap by providing greater work opportunities that will also boost self-esteem; using mass media communication channels to educate and sensitize public opinion to this issue; passing further legislation with harsher sanctions and disciplinary measures within the party, given that the laws and legislation currently in force seem to have had little effect in discouraging the dissolute practices of certain government officials. An emblematic case is that of Pang Jiayu, the former deputy head of the provincial political advisory body in the northwestern province of Shaanxi, on whom, in 2007, charges were brought collectively by his 11 lovers (Watts, 2007) . Another example is the so called "100 days' campaign" launched by the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau last June to crack down on environmental pollution on the streets and ensure order in society (Cao Yin, 2011 ).
Whether or not China will succeed in reducing or eradicating the phenomenon of ernai is difficult to say. What is certain though, is that if this problem, together with all others that derive from it, is not effectively addressed, the sustenance of a harmonious society (hexie shehui) much talked about by the current leaders in power, will be heavily compromised.
